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Abstract
We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a
Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored via
stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling
structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak
Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are de-
terministic these two conditions coincide and by a recent result due to
[Shmaya (2011)] entail determinacy of the game. We generalize [Shmaya (2011)]’s
result and show that in the stochastic learning environment SEPM implies
determinacy while WSEPM does not.
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4. We provide an example in which determinacy fails under the weaker struc-
ture.
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1 Introduction
The issue of the existence of the value in zero-sum games of infinite duration has
a long and rich history. In such games, sometimes called Gale-Stewart games,
players play sequentially, one after the other, back and forth forever. Early mod-
els considered a perfect information monitoring structure. [Gale and Stewart (1953)]
began this line by showing that if the eventual winning set W - the set Player
1 strives to have the infinite play of the game belong to, while Player 2 strives
that the play not belong - is either open or closed, then one player can force
a win. [Wolfe (1956)] (also [Blackwell (1969)]) extended this result to the case
where W is Gδ (or, symmetrically, Fσ). Eventually, [Martin (1975)] demon-
strated that if W is a Borel set, then the game is determined.
A natural generalization is the case in which the monitoring structure is not
perfect. In fact, [Blackwell (1969)] already incorporated this result by allowing
the actions to be simultaneous - equivalent to a one-round information delay
on the part of Player 2. In such cases, one cannot hope that one player or the
other can force a win. Nonetheless, we can hope that the game - in which a win
for a player is interpreted as the gain of a unit from the other player - possesses
a value. This weakened concept has earned, counter-intuitively or not, the title
of determinacy as well, and has enjoyed generalization to more general payoff
functions as well; see [Martin (1998)]. An application of such games to manip-
ulability of inspections can be found in [Shmaya (2008)]; for pure mathematical
applications, see, e.g., [Kechris(1995)].
Building on these results and motivations, [Shmaya (2011)] made a signifi-
cant step forward when considering very general delays in information. [Shmaya (2011)]
required only that each player have, at each stage, a partition over his oppo-
nent’s possible histories of play, and learns to refine this partitions over time to
the extent that he can eventually differentiate between any two different plays.
This condition is termed in [Shmaya (2011)] as Eventual Perfect Monitoring
(henceforth, EPM), and it is shown that it is sufficient to guarantee determi-
nacy.
Our work focuses on a generalization of the EPM setup to games in which, as
well, information is learned at a delay, but not by deterministic methods such
as the partitions used in EPM, but rather by stochastic signalling. The first
pressing question is, then, what should be the natural generalization of EPM?
The key, it seems, is to observe the stochastic kernel (for each player) from
infinite sequences of plays of the game to infinite sequences of his own signals.
The natural generalization of partitions being disjoint to the non-deterministic
case is the condition of measures being mutually singular. As such, two natural
conditions on the monitoring structure have arisen:
One condition, to which we give the title of Stochastic Eventual Perfect
Monitoring (henceforth, SEPM), requires that any two profiles of strategies
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which induce mutually orthogonal distributions on the space of plays of the
game should induce, for each player, mutually orthogonal distributions on the
space of sequences of that player. A weaker condition, however, which we call
Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (henceforth, WSEPM), requires
only that for any two different infinite histories of play, the induced measures
on the space of signals of either player should be mutually orthogonal. These
conditions coincide in the case of the deterministic signalling of [Shmaya (2011)].
The purpose of this paper is then two-fold: Our main result is that SEPM
is sufficient to imply determinacy. Our technique generalizes the techniques of
[Shmaya (2011)], and like that work includes a reduction to a stochastic game
with Borel winning set. In this framework, we also generalize [Shmaya (2011)]
by allowing for stochastic states of Nature to be chosen at each period. Our
other main result is to show, by example - and via development of some tech-
niques that we hope are of independent interest - that WSEPM is not sufficient
to guarantee determinacy. (In particular, this shows that WSEPM does not im-
ply SEPM.) Properties and equivalent reformulations of the SEPM condition,
as well as other applications, can be found in [Arieli and Levy (In Preperation)].
Our result and the distinction with the result of [Shmaya (2011)] can be
nicely illustrated using terms from interactive epistemology. Shmaya’s EPM
condition implies that every action played, eventually becomes common knowl-
edge among the players. More precisely, every finite history h of size n that is
played with positive probability becomes commonly known among the players
after a fixed deterministic time t. In contrast, [Cripps et al. (2008)] consider a
two player game with incomplete information and show that in order for the
two players to be able to play the efficient equilibrium (coordinate an attack)
the state and the fact that the other player is going to play the efficient equilib-
rium strategy must become approximate common knowledge among the players.
In epistemic terms the SEPM condition is fundamentally different than that
of [Shmaya (2011)] and [Cripps et al. (2008)]. Our condition, it turns out, in
addition to only implying p-belief (as coined in [Monderer and Samet (1989)])
and not knowledge, only implies mutual belief and not common belief. (See
Proposition 3.1.) That is, for every order k (and each p < 1), any action played
eventually becomes mutual p-belief up to k levels among the players: Each player
p-believes it, each player p-believes that each p-believes it, and so on up to k
levels, but it need never become common p-belief, i.e., the chain of mutual p-
belief may never, at any finite time, be continued ad infinitum. This difference is
discussed further in [Arieli and Levy (In Preperation)]. Our determinacy result
shows that the eventual common learning - or more precisely, common p-belief
- is not what is required for determinacy - but rather only mutual learning in
the appropriate sense.
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2 Model, Examples, and Results
2.1 Preliminary Notation
For a Borel space S,1 let ∆(S) denote the space of regular Borel probability
measure on S, endowed with the topology of narrow convergence. Given µ, ν ∈
∆(S), the total variation distance2 is
||µ− ν|| = 2 sup
A⊆S
|µ(A)− ν(A)|
For a finite set A, we denote by |A| or #A the cardinality of A. For two sets
A,B, A∆B denotes the symmetric difference. For n ∈ N, let [n] = j ∈ {1, 2} be
such that j = [n] mod 2.
For Borel spaces X,Y , a mapping f : X → Y , and an ν ∈ ∆(X), we let
f∗(ν) denote the induced measure on Y given by f∗(ν)(A) = ν(f−1(A)). By a
transition kernel η(· | ·) from X to Y , we mean a measurable mapping from X
to ∆(Y ) - i.e., for each x ∈ X, η(· | x) (or, for brevity, η(x)) is a probability
measure on Y such that for each Borel A ⊆ Y , η(A | ·) is Borel measurable. If
ν ∈ ∆(X), then η(ν) denotes the induced measure on Y ,
η(ν)(A) =
∫
X
η(A | x)dν(x)
2.2 Definition
Definition 2.1. A two-player zero-sum sequential game with signals is given
by a quadrupole Γ(W ) = ((An)n∈N, q,Θ, (ηn)n∈N,W ) where:
• An is the finite action space used at stage n, respectively.
• W is a subset of H∞ :=
∏
n∈NAn.
• Θ is a standard Borel space of signals.3
• For each n ∈ N, ηn :
∏
k<nAk → ∆(Θ2) is the transition kernel of signals.
Denote Hn =
∏
k<nAk, H∗ = ∪nHn.
The dynamics of the game are as follows: Player 1 (resp. 2) plays at odd
(resp. even) stages. Before stage n, a signal is revealed to each player4 - denote
1That is, a space homeomorphic to a Borel subset of a complete separable metric space.
2The supremum is taken over Borel sets, of course. In some of the appendices, the to-
tal variation distance is applied to pairs of measures which are not necessarily probability
measures, and this definition does not apply; we refer the reader to standard references, e.g.,
[Rudin (1986)].
3One could also allow for time-dependent signals - as we will later - by taking Θ to be a
disjoint union of all signalling spaces.
4Since Player 1 plays only at odd stages and Player 2 only at even stages, it’s actually not
necessary that each player receive a signal at each stage; it would have sufficed if they receive
before they play; i.e., every other stage. It is simpler for our notation, however, to assume
they each receive a signal at each stage.
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the signal to Player j before stage n by θjn; given h ∈ Hn the pair (θ1n, θ2n) is cho-
sen by Nature according to the distribution ηn(h); we will denote the marginal
on each coordinate by ηjn for j = 1, 2. Following this, Player [n] chooses an
action in An.
Player 1 wins if the resulting infinite history h ∈ H∞ is in W (and receives
a payoff of one unit from player 2); Player 2 wins (and receives one unit from
Player 1) if h /∈W .
2.3 The Signalling Transition Kernels
We define the mappings η, on H∗ - specifically, each element of Hn defines a
distribution inductively on (Θ2)n - by
η(a1, . . . , an−1)[θ11, θ
2
1, . . . , θ
1
n, θ
2
n] =
∏
i≤n
η(a1, . . . , ai−1)[θ1i , θ
2
i ]
That is, given a finite history of play, η gives the distribution induced on the
signals.
Let η1(h), η2(h) be the marginals on the signals for Player 1, 2, respectively.
We shall make the following assumption throughout:
Assumption 2.2. (Perfect Recall) Let j ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ N, and let5 pijH : Hn →∏
[s]=j,s<nAs be the projection of j’s actions. Then, for any two ρ, λ ∈ ∆(Hn)
which satisfy (pijH)∗(ρ)⊥(pijH)∗(λ), we have6 ηj(ρ)⊥ηj(λ).
Hence (since there are only finitely many actions), each player can almost
surely deduce his own previous actions from the signals he has received, and
hence when defining strategies below, we may assume each player makes deci-
sions depending only his signals.
As such, we have two transition kernels ηj∞, j ∈ {1, 2}, from H∞ to Θ∞;
each infinite history h ∈ H∞ induces probability distributions ηj∞(h) on Θ∞
for j = 1, 2 - that is, probability distributions on the sequence of each players’
signals defined for cylindrical sets by
ηj∞(a1, a2, . . .)({θ ∈ Θ∞ | θn = p}) = ηj(a1, . . . , an−1)(θn = p), ∀ p ∈ Θn
Examples of signalling structures are given in Section 2.8.
2.4 Strategies
A behavioral strategy for Player 1 is a sequence of measurable functions σ =
{σn}n=1,3,5,..., where σn assigns to each sequence (θ11, . . . , θ1n−1, θ1n) ∈ Θn a
mixed action in ∆(An), and similarly for Player 2 at the even stages. By the
5This is different than pij used later, which will be the projection to Player j’s signal space.
6Recall the notation of Section 2.1.
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assumption we made above, players able to choose from these families of behav-
ioral strategies have perfect recall.
Each pair of behavioral strategies (σ, τ) induces a probability distribution
Pσ,τ on H˜∞ := H∞×Θ∞×Θ∞, the space, of infinite plays of the game includ-
ing the sequences of signals the players receive.
2.5 Deterministic Signalling and Determinacy
The concept defined in [Shmaya (2011)] can be found in our context in the
following manner:
Definition 2.3. The signalling structure of a game, with notation as Definition
2.1, is said to be deterministic if ηn(h) is a Dirac measure for each n ∈ N,
h ∈ Hn. In this case, let η1∞, η2∞ be the functions7 defined on H∞, which assign
to each infinite history the resulting infinite sequence of signals for Player 1,2,
respectively. The game is said to have eventual perfect monitoring (EPM) if
η1∞, η
2
∞ are injective.
Informally, Shmaya’s EPM condition holds if for every two distinct infinite
histories of play, there exists a finite time n such that at time n each player can
distinguish between the two histories.
Γ(W ) is said to be determined if it possesses a value, that is, if
sup
σ∈Σ
inf
τ∈Υ
Pσ,τ (W ) = inf
τ∈Υ
sup
σ∈Σ
Pσ,τ (W )
where Σ (resp. Υ) is the space of behavioral strategies for Player 1 (resp. 2).
The main result of [Shmaya (2011)] is:
Theorem 2.4. If a game has a Borel winning set, and deterministic signalling
which satisfies the EPM condition, then the game is determined.
2.6 SEPM & The Main Result for Sequential Games
When dealing with stochastic signals rather then deterministic, there are two
natural extension to Shmaya’s EPM condition.
Definition 2.5. The game is said to possess Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect
Monitoring (henceforth, WSEPM) if for any two h, h′ ∈ H∞, ηj∞(h)⊥ηj∞(h′)
for each j ∈ {1, 2}.
This condition, while simple to state, lacks sufficient strength for our needs,
and hence we define:
7For any Borel space Y , the set of Dirac measures is a closed subspace of ∆(Y ) and the
mapping y → δy is a homeomorphism onto it; e.g., [Bertsekas and Shreve (1996), Cor. 7.21.1].
Hence, η1, η2 are Borel.
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Definition 2.6. Let piH : H˜∞ → H∞, (resp. pi1, pi2 : H˜∞ → Θ∞) be the
projections on the space of plays (resp. sequences of signals for Players 1, 2).
The game is said to possess Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (hence-
forth, SEPM) if for any pair of profile strategies (σ, τ) and (σ′, τ ′) such that
piH∗ (Pσ,τ )⊥piH∗ (Pσ′,τ ′), it holds that pij∗(Pσ,τ )⊥pij∗(Pσ′,τ ′) for j = 1, 2.
Remark 2.7. Observe that pij∗(Pσ,τ ) = ηj(piH∗ (Pσ,τ )).
The SEPM condition states that if two pairs of strategy profiles induce mu-
tually singular distributions over the set of plays then they also induce mutually
singular distributions over the set of signals for each player j. In contrast the
WSEPM require only that every two distinct infinite histories induce singular
distributions over the set of signals for each player j.
Remark 2.8. Clearly, these two conditions coincide in the case of deterministic
signalling.
We further highlight the distinction between these two conditions in Section
2.8. The main result for sequential games is:
Theorem 2.9. If a sequential game has a Borel winning set, and signalling
which satisfies the SEPM condition, then the game is determined.
The other result for sequential games of this paper is to show, by examples,
that WSEPM does not guarantee determinacy. (In particular, WSEPM does
not imply SEPM.)
Section 3 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2.13. We rely on a technique
introduced by [Shmaya (2011)], where a reduction was made to a stochastic
game with standard signalling. A game satisfying WSEPM but which is not
determined is given in Section 4.
2.7 Generalization: Stochastic Games
Definition 2.10. A two-player zero-sum (sequential8) stochastic game with sig-
nals is given by a sextuple Γ(W ) = ((Sn)n∈N, (An)n∈N, q,Θ, (ηn)n∈N,W ) where:
• Sn, An are the finite state and action spaces used at stage n, respectively.
• W is a subset of H∞ :=
∏
n∈N(Sn ×An).
• Θ is a standard Borel space of signals.
• For each n ∈ N, qn : Hn−1 → ∆(Sn) is the transition kernel of states,
where Hn−1 =
∏
k<n Sk ×Ak (H0 = {∅}).
• For each n ∈ N, ηn : Hn → ∆(Θ2), where Hn = Hn−1 × Sn, is the
transition kernel of signals.
8To differentiate from the standard stochastic game models in which players play simulta-
neously.
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We will also denote H˜n =
∏
k<n(Sk×Θ2×Ak), H˜∞ =
∏
k<∞(Sk×Θ2×Ak),
H∗ = ∪nHn, and H∗ = ∪nHn. We will treat the transition kernel of signals as a
single function η : H∗ → ∆(Θ2), and similarly we will view the state transition
kernel as a single function q : H∗ → ∆(∪nSn) with supp(q(h)) ⊆ Sn for h ∈ Hn.
The dynamics of the game are as follows: The initial state z1 is chosen by
Nature according to the distribution q(∅). Suppose at some stage n, the history
of the game up to that point being h = (z1, a1, . . . , zn−1, an−1, zn) ∈ Hn. A
signal is revealed to each player - denote the signal to Player j by θjn; the pair
(θ1n, θ
2
n) is chosen by Nature according to the distribution η(h); we will denote
the marginal on each coordinate by ηj for j = 1, 2. Following this, Player [n]
chooses an action in An. The next state zn+1 is chosen according to the distri-
bution q(z1, a1, . . . , zn, an), and the process repeats.
Player 1 wins if the resulting infinite history h ∈ H∞ is in W (and receives
a payoff of one unit from player 2); Player 2 wins if h /∈ W , and receives one
unit from Player 1).
The transition kernels η1, η2 (resp. η1∞, η
2
∞) are now defined on H

∗ (resp.
H∞), and the notions of perfect recall (with Hn+1 replacing Hn in Assumption
2.2), strategies (note that strategies still depend only on signals received, the
players do not directly observe the states), and determinacy are defined in the
same way as they were for sequential games.
Definition 2.11. qˆ = (qˆ1, qˆ2, . . .) with qˆn : Hn−1 → ∆(Sn) is said to be a belief
on Nature if for each n ∈ N and each h ∈ Hn, there is Sn,h ⊆ Sn such that
q(h)(Sn,h) > 0 and qˆ(h)(·) = q(h)(· | Sn,h).
Just like above, given a belief on Nature qˆ and a strategy profile σ, τ , Pqˆ,σ,τ
is the induced probability measure on H˜∞ when the original transition kernel q
is replaced with qˆ.
Definition 2.12. Let piH : H˜∞ → H∞ =
∏
n∈N St × At, (resp. pi1, pi2 : H˜∞ →
Θ∞) be projections on the space of plays (resp. sequences of signals for Play-
ers 1, 2). The game is said to possess Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
(henceforth, SEPM) if for any pair of profile strategies (σ, τ) and (σ′, τ ′) and
any pair of beliefs on Nature qˆ, qˆ′ such that piH∗ (Pqˆ,σ,τ )⊥piH∗ (Pqˆ′,σ′,τ ′), it holds
that pij∗(Pqˆ,σ,τ )⊥pij∗(Pqˆ′,σ′,τ ′) for j = 1, 2.
The main theorem of this paper is:
Theorem 2.13. Theorem 2.9 holds for stochastic games with SEPM as well.
Remark 2.14. [Shmaya (2011)] works under the assumption that there are no
states; i.e., Sn is trivial for all n ∈ N. However, the proof there can be modified
easily to incorporate states. This also follows from our main Theorem 2.13
below.
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Remark 2.15. We remark that the addition of the beliefs of Nature to the
definition of SEPM helps facilitate the learning: Otherwise, we could have a
situation where each player has trivial action spaces (only one option) and yet
non-trivial state spaces. In that case, a notion of SEPM not allowing for beliefs
on Nature would hold trivially - since there is only one action profile - and yet
players would not necessarily learn anything about the states. However, in such
an example, determinacy would follow trivially so it is not clear to what extent
this stringency of the SEPM condition is needed for Theorem 2.13 to hold.
Remark 2.16. If one wants to define WSEPM for stochastic games in such a way
that SEPM implies WSEPM, one should phrase Definition 2.5 as holding for
those h, h′ ∈ H∞ such that for every n ∈ N, there exists strategy profiles σ, τ ,
σ′, τ ′ for which the projections h|n, h′|n satisfy Pσ,τ (h|n) > 0, Pσ′,τ ′(h′|n) > 0
(i.e., those histories which are assigned positive probabilities for some stratagy
profile.) If one would generalize the definition without this modification - i.e.,
requiring it to hold for all h, h′ ∈ H∞ - it is not clear if SEPM implies WSEPM.
Remark 2.17. Like in [Shmaya (2011)], it is still unknown if determinacy con-
tinues to hold if the payoff is given not by a Borel winning set but by a more
general bounded Borel payoff function.
2.8 Examples of Monitoring Structures
Example #1: Suppose A1 = {L,R}, while An is a singleton for n ≥ 2; i.e.,
Player 1 plays once and no one plays thereafter. There are no states. There is a
sequence (αn)
∞
n=2 with 0 < αn <
1
2 and αn → 0. At stage n ≥ 2, a public coin
gives H with probability 12 + αn if L was played (and T otherwise), and with
probability 12 − αn if R was played.9
Formally, Player 2’s strategy space Υ is trivial; Player 1’s space of be-
havioural strategies Σ are the mixtures of σL and σR which play L,R, re-
spectively; clearly, the only pair of behavioural strategies which induce singu-
lar distributions on H∞ = A1 are the pair of pure strategies σL, σR. Hence,
to verify SEPM, we need to check (using the notation of Definition 2.6) that
pi2∗(PσL)⊥pi2∗(PσR). It’s also immediate that in this case, SEPM and WSEPM
coincide, since there are only two possible histories (they indeed coincide when-
ever there are finitely many histories - i.e., if after some point, the players’ action
spaces turn trivial). Clearly,
pi2∗(PσL) = ⊗∞n=2(
1
2
+ αn,
1
2
− αn), pi2∗(PσR) = ⊗∞n=2(
1
2
− αn, 1
2
+ αn)
By assumption, lim supn αn <
1
2 . The Kakutani criterion, [Kakutani (1948)],
establishes that if
∑∞
n=2 α
2
n =∞, then pi2∗(PσL)⊥pi2∗(PσR), and we have SEPM,
but if
∑∞
n=2 α
2
n < ∞, then they are equivalent10 and hence SEPM does not
9Player 1 is deterministically informed of his action, and we do not directly specify his
signalling structure.
10That is, absolutely continuous w.r.t. each other.
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hold. In particular, if αn ≡ α for some fixed 0 < α < 12 , then SEPM holds. For
such a case, this can be seen without resorting to the Kakutani criterion, rather
as a simple application of the law of large numbers: Define
VL = {(θ1, θ2, . . .) | lim
n→∞
|{k ≤ n | θk = H}|
n
=
1
2
+ α}
and VR similarly with T replacing H. VL ∩ VR = ∅, but pi2∗(PσL)(VL) = 1 while
pi2∗(PσR)(VR) = 1.
Example #2: Delayed monitoring is another classical example. The sig-
nalling is deterministic (for simplicity, assume no states): There exist two func-
tions ψ1, ψ2 : N → N which are increasing and satisfy ψj(n) ≥ n + 1 for all
n. The interpretation is that Player j is informed of his opponent’s n-th action
at the beginning of stage ψj(n). Such deterministic kernels are then injective
functions, and hence SEPM is satisfied; see Section 2.5.
Example #3: This is the model studied in [Cripps et al. (2008)]. There
are no actions, S1 = S is a finite stage space in the first stage, and Sn is trivial
for n ≥ 2. Nature chooses an element of S with distribution q (w.l.o.g., q(s) > 0
for all s ∈ S). The signal spaces for the players are finite, Θ1 and Θ2. For each
s ∈ S, there is a joint distribution ηs ∈ ∆(Θ1 × Θ2), such that if s 6= s′, then
the marginals ηjs and η
j
s′ of Player j differ for each j ∈ {1, 2}. After the initial
choice s by Nature, at each stage n = 1, 2, 3, . . ., private signals are chosen i.i.d.
according to the distribution ηs at each stage.
Using the notations of Definition 2.12, let q˜, q˜′ be two beliefs of Nature such
that piH∗ (Pq˜)⊥piH∗ (Pq˜′). In this case, this clearly means that Pq˜ = Pq(· | A) and
Pq˜′ = Pq(· | A′) for disjoint A,A′ ⊆ S. The law of large numbers implies that if
for j ∈ {1, 2}, we define (V js )s∈S by
V js = {(θ1, θ2, . . .) | ∀θ∗ ∈ Θj , lim
n→∞
|{k ≤ n | θk = θ∗}|
n
= ηjs[θ
∗]}
then for each j ∈ {1, 2}, (V js )s∈S are disjoint,
pij∗(Pq˜)(∪s∈AV js ) = 1 and pij∗(Pq˜′)(∪s∈A′V js ) = 1
hence SEPM hold (and hence WSEPM, since the set of possible histories is
again finite).
Cripps et al. have in fact showed that a stronger type of learning holds in
this example, that of common p-learning. The differences between the types of
learning are discussed in more detail in [Arieli and Levy (In Preperation)].
Example #4: Here is an example where WSEPM holds but SEPM does
not. Player 2 has no actions, so for simplicity of notation, let Player 1 play
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at each stage (not just the odd stages). Fix some α ∈ (0, 1). At each stage,
Player 1 chooses an action in {L,R}. (There are no states.) After his n-th
choice, there are 2n possible histories in Hn+1 = {L,R}n. For each of these
histories, Nature independently performs a lottery which chooses values 1 or
0: Formally,11 θn+1 ∈ {0, 1}Hn+1 ; for the true history h ∈ Hn+1, θn+1(h) = 1,
while for other h′ ∈ Hn+1, θn+1(h′) = 1 (resp. = 0) with probability α (resp.
1− α), and for h′ 6= h′′, θn+1(h′) and θn+1(h′′) are independent.
Clearly, then, a false history will be found out because it will almost certainly
receive a 0 at some point. Hence, for every h = (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ H∞ = {L,R}∞,
define Vh = {(θ2, . . . , ) | ∀n ∈ N, θn+1(a1, . . . , an) = 1}, then (in the notation
of Definition 2.6), η2∞(h)(Vh) = 1 while for all other h
′ ∈ H∞, η2∞(h′)(Vh) = 0.
Hence WSEPM is satisfied.
However, for α > 12 , we contend that SEPM is not satisfied; we argue
heuristically since a similar but more involved example will be treated formally
in Section 4. The signalling process is similar to a branching process, which
begins with a single organism, and in which in each generation, each live or-
ganism gives birth to two offsprings (after it gives birth it dies); each offspring
lives to the next generation with probability α. It is known that if α > 12 , then
almost surely there are many infinite generation lines. Hence, even though in
our case the signal process will lead to an ’infinite generation line’ along the
true history, it leads in any case to many such infinite lines. Hence, if we take
two singular distributions on H∞, each of which is very dispersed - for example,
one chooses L at the first stage while the other chooses R, and thereafter they
both randomise uniformly - if α is close to 1, the resulting distributions will be
very very similar. (The dispersion of the measures is required, otherwise one
can pin-point the exact infinite generation lines we expect to find, as was done
above to show WSEPM.)
On the other hand, if α < 12 , it follows readily from the discussion in
[Karlin and Taylor, Sec. 3, p. 396] that the probability of having at least
one generation line surviving at n generations goes to 0 as n → ∞, and hence
if we impose an infinite generation line along the true history, it will stand out
noticeably and the true history could be recovered as the others die out.12
11Here the signal space is time-dependent. As was remarked in a footnote in the presentation
of the model how to incorporate time-dependent signals: by taking the signal space to be the
disjoint union of signal spaces over all periods.
12More concretely, given a specific finite history h ∈ H∗, players will learn whether h
occurred or not with arbitrarily high reliability, which is what is needed to SEPM (as adverse
to WSEPM); see Proposition 3.1 and the remarks after it.
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3 Proof of Theorem 2.13
3.1 Preliminaries
We henceforth assume that Γ(W ) satisfies the SEPM assumption. We shall
first make a reduction to the case in which the signal spaces are finite but
stage-dependent. Deriving the general form of the theorem from the case in
which signals spaces are finite is relegated to Appendix B, and henceforth we
will continue under the assumption that signals spaces are finite but state-
dependent, with signal space Θn (for each player) used at stage n.
Proposition 3.1. Let h ∈ H∗ , and let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile with Pσ,τ (h) >
0. If SEPM holds, then for each ε > 0, there is N ∈ N such that for j = 1, 2
and all n ≥ N ,
Pσ,τ (Pσ,τ (h|θj1, . . . , θjn) > 1− ε | h) > 1− ε (3.1)
In other words, given that some h ∈ H∗ has occurred, as time goes by, there is
high probability that a player performing Bayesian updating will associate high
probability to h having occurred. When there are no states, this condition was
shown to be equivalent to SEPM,13 [Arieli and Levy (In Preperation)] and was
termed Eventual Learning, but we only require one direction, and we provide in
Appendix C here a proof more direct than that in [Arieli and Levy (In Preperation)];
in that work, other equivalent conditions are also discussed.
Corollary 3.2. Let h ∈ H∗ , and let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile with Pσ,τ (h) >
0. If SEPM holds, then for each j = 1, 2, Pσ,τ (h|θj1, . . . , θjn) → 1h in Pσ,τ -
probability, i.e., for each ε > 0, there is N ∈ N such that for j = 1, 2 and
n ≥ N ,
Pσ,τ (|Pσ,τ (h|θj1, . . . , θjn)− 1h| > ε) < ε (3.2)
Proof. Assume h ∈ H` ; SEPM implies (3.1) holds for h as well as for any of the
finitely many other h′ ∈ H` for large enough n and each j = 1, 2, and hence
one deduces that for large enough n and j = 1, 2, for each h′ ∈ H` with h′ 6= h,
Pσ,τ (Pσ,τ (h|θj1, . . . , θjn) < ε | h′) > 1− ε (3.3)
and multiplying by P (h′) and summing over all h′ ∈ H` with h′ 6= h gives
Pσ,τ (Pσ,τ (h|θj1, . . . , θjn) < ε | H` \{h}) > 1− ε (3.4)
This together with (3.1) gives (3.2) for large enough n and j = 1, 2.
The following is essentially Corollary 4.3 of [Shmaya (2011)] and we do not
repeat the proof.
13It’s not clear if this equivalence still holds when states are added.
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Lemma 3.3. Let ε > 0, recall that the stage dependent signal spaces Θ1,Θ2, . . .
are finite.14 There exists a sequence of finite sets (∆εn)n∈N, with ∆
ε
n ⊆ ∆(An),
such that for any pair of behavioral strategies σ, τ , there is a pair σ′, τ ′ which
choose, at each stage n, mixed actions in ∆εn, and such that ||Pσ,τˆ − Pσ′,τˆ || < ε
and ||Pσˆ,τ−Pσˆ,τ ′ || < ε for any strategies σˆ, τˆ , the norm being the total-variation
norm.
For each ε > 0, fix such (∆εk)k∈N, recall that Σ,Υ denote the set of be-
havioural strategies for Player 1, 2, respectively, and let Σε,Υε be those strate-
gies taking mixed actions in (∆εk). Let Θn =
∏
k≤n Θn.
Lemma 3.4. Assume SEPM. For each h ∈ H∗ , ε > 0, there is N = N(h, ε),
such that for all strategy profiles (σ, τ) in Σε×Υε, each j = 1, 2, and all n ≥ N ,
(3.2) holds.
Proof. Let h ∈ H` and ε > 0. For each n, let Σεn be the strategies of Player 1
in the first n stages which make choices in (∆εk)k≤n, i.e., Σ
ε
n =
∏
[k]=1,k≤n
(∆εk)
Θk ,
and similarly define Υεn =
∏
[k]=2,k≤n
(∆εk)
Θk . Denote V = ∪∞n=0Σεn × Υεn, and
on this set of vertices, define a tree structure, in which v′, v′′ are connected if
for some n, v′ = (σ′, τ ′) ∈ Σεn × Υεn, v′′ = (σ′′, τ ′′) ∈ Σεn+1 × Υεn+1, and the
restriction of (σ′′, τ ′′) to the domain of (σ′, τ ′) agrees with (σ′, τ ′) (i.e., if they
agree through n stages).
Clearly, every infinite branch of the resulting tree defines an element (σ, τ)
of Σε × Υε. For n ≥ `, let Vn denote all the vertices (σn, τn) ∈ Σεn × Υεn such
that for j = 1, 2,
Pσn,τn(|Pσn,τn(h|θj1, . . . , θjn)− 1h| >
ε3
2
) <
ε3
8
(3.5)
and let V 0 = ∪∞n=`Vn. Then, let W be the tree resulting from V when all
elements of V 0 and any of their descendants are removed. By Corollary 3.2,
W has no infinite branches - every infinite branch includes an element of V 0.
Hence, since each node in W has finite degree, Ko¨nig’s lemma implies that W
has finite depth N = N(h, ε); i.e., for n > N , (Σεn × Υεn) ∩W = ∅. Hence, for
j = 1, 2, and any (σ, τ) ∈ Σε × Υε, there is K ≤ N (specifically, some K for
which (σ, τ) restricted to the first K stages is in VK) such that
Pσ,τ (|Pσ,τ (h|θj1, . . . , θjK)− 1h| >
ε3
2
) <
ε3
2
(3.6)
and hence by Lemma 5.5, for n > K (and, in particular, for n > N) and j = 1, 2,
(3.2) holds.
14This lemma remains correct even if the state spaces are general; but the proof is straight-
forward for the case of finite signal spaces.
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Remark 3.5. We introduce the following notation, based on Lemma 3.4. Fix
ε > 0. For each k ∈ N, let
N(k, ε) = max
h∈Hk
N(h, ε)
Proposition 3.6. If W is compact, then Γ(W ) is determined.
Note that we do not make any requirements of the signalling structure for
this result. The proof is essentially the same as Lemma 3.1 of [Shmaya (2011)],
and we sketch it for convenience:
Proof. The mapping from pure behavioral strategies - which are compact spaces
in the product topology - to expected payoff15 is upper semi-continuous in this
game. Hence, by Fan’s minimax theorem, a value exists in mixed strategies.16
Since the game has perfect recall, behavioral strategies are equivalent to mixed
strategies, by Kuhn’s theorem.
3.2 The Auxiliary Game Λ
Fix 0 < ε < 1, let (∆εn) be the finite action spaces that correspond to ε as in
Lemma 3.3, and let N(·, ·) be the function in Remark 3.5. (Recall that we are in
the case where the signal spaces are finite but state-dependent, (Θn)
∞
n=1.) We
define an auxiliary stochastic game Λ of perfect information:
Let Bn = {b : Θn → ∆εn} be the set of actions at stage n = 1, 2, . . . in
Λ (recall Θn =
∏
k≤n Θn). Denote Bn =
∏
k≤nBk. Define N : N → N by
N(k) = N(k, ε
2k|Hk | ), and let
17
Kn = {k ∈ N | N(k) = n}, Tn =
∏
k∈Kn
Ak−1 × Sk
where we take A0 to be trivial. Tn is the set of states of stage n in Λ. Kn can be
described as those stages ’approximately’ learned by stage n and not necessarily
earlier; Tn is what is actually learned.
For each n ∈ N, define K(n) = max{k | N(k) ≤ n} = max[∪m≤nKm] -
that is, the maximal stage approximately learned by stage n - and define for
j = 1, 2, f˜ jn : Bn−1 × (Θn)2 → HK(n), where f˜ jn(βn−1, θn), for βn−1 ∈ Bn−1
15This is the only difference from the corresponding lemma in [Shmaya (2011)] - pure strat-
egy profiles here do not yield deterministic payoffs.
16That is, mixtures of pure behavioral strategies.
17Note that Kn may be empty - indeed, for growing information lags, it will be empty for
most n - and in this case, Tn = {∅}.
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and θn ∈ Θn, is the h ∈ HK(n) such that1819
PβN(K(n))−1(h|θ
j
N(K(n))) > 1−
ε
2K(n) · |H
K(n)|
, j = 1, 2 (3.7)
(If such h exists, it is unique.20) Otherwise, let f˜ jn(βn−1, θ
j
n) be an arbitrary
element of HK(n). That is, f˜
j
n returns, for Player j, what he thinks with high
probability has occurred, given the signals θ
j
N(K(n)) he’s seen and given the
strategies βN(K(n))−1 that have been employed, at the last time N(K(n)) at
which he had enough information to make a new deduction (and not at each
stage anew).
For brevity, we will write f˜n(βn−1, θn) instead of f˜
1
n(βn−1, θn) (as the fol-
lowing lemma shows, f˜1 and f˜2 coincide with high probability anyway).
Lemma 3.7. For any pair of behavioral strategies σ, τ in Γε,Υε,
Pσ,τ
(∃n ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2}, f˜ jn(βn−1, θjn) 6= (z1, a1, . . . , zK(n))) ≤ 2ε
where βj = σj for odd j, βj = τj for even j.
Proof. Let σ, τ in Σε,Υε, j ∈ {1, 2}. Observe that for each k ∈ range(K), and
each h ∈ Hk , by the definition of f˜ jn,
{f˜ j
N(k)(βN(k)−1, θ
j
N(k)) 6= h ∧ h = (z1, a1, . . . , zk)}
⊆ {Pσ,τ (h|θjN(k)) ≤ 1−
ε
2k · |Hk |
∧ 1h(z1, a1, . . . , zk) = 1}
⊆ {|Pσ,τ (h|θjN(k))− 1h| ≥
ε
2k · |Hk |
}
and the latter event has Pσ,τ probability less than
ε
2k·|Hk | , by definition of N(·).
18The distribution induced on H
K(n)
×Θn is dependent only on the strategies in the first
n− 1 stages, hence the term Pβn−1 (h|θ
j
n) is well-defined.
19Note that n ≥ N(K(n)), and N(k) = n when k = K(n).
20Since 1− ε
2K(n)|H
K(n)
| >
1
2
.
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Hence, noticing that by definition, f˜ j
N(K(n))(βN(K(n))−1, θ
j
N(K(n))) = f˜
j
n(βn−1, θ
j
n),
Pσ,τ
(∃n ∈ N, f˜ jn(βn−1, θjn) 6= (z1, a1, . . . , zK(n)))
= Pσ,τ
(∃n ∈ N, f˜ j
N(K(n))(βN(K(n))−1, θ
j
N(K(n))) 6= (z1, a1, . . . , zK(n))
)
≤
∑
n∈N
Pσ,τ
(
f˜ j
N(K(n))(βN(K(n))−1, θ
j
N(K(n))) 6= (z1, a1, . . . , zK(n))
)
=
∑
k∈range(K)
Pσ,τ
(
f˜ j
N(k)(βN(k)−1, θ
j
N(k)) 6= (z1, a1, . . . , zk)
)
=
∑
k∈range(K)
∑
h∈Hk
Pσ,τ
(
f˜ j
N(k)(βN(k)−1, θ
j
N(k)) 6= h ∧ h = (z1, a1, . . . , zk)
)
≤
∑
k∈range(K)
∑
h∈Hk
Pσ,τ
(|Pσ,τ (h|θjN(k))− 1h| > ε2k · |Hk |) ≤
∑
k∈range(K)
∑
h∈Hk
ε
2k · |Hk |
≤ ε
and this was for j = 1, 2.
Let pin : H

n → Tn be defined by projection, and let F : T1 × T2 × · · · → H∞
be defined by
F ((pin(u|n))n∈N) = u
By mildly abusive notation, F : T1 × · · · × Tn → HK(n), which is the projection
of F defined above onto HK(n); this is well-defined, as these first K(n) coordi-
nates in the output of F depends only on the first n coordinates of
∏
m Tm. Let
fk = pik ◦ f˜k.
In Λ, Player 1 plays at odd stages, Player 2 plays at even stages, with perfect
monitoring. Given p = (t1, b1, . . . , tn−1, bn−1) ∈ T1×B1×· · ·×Tn−1×Bn−1, we
need to define the distribution induced on the next state - i.e., the distribution
on Tn - that Nature employs. To do that we define a sequence of auxiliary
random variables (θˆn)
∞
n=1, (zˆn)
∞
n=1, and (aˆn)
∞
n=1. These variables satisfy for
every n that θˆn ∈ Θ2n, zˆn ∈ Sn, and aˆn ∈ An, and are distributed as follows:
P (zˆn | zˆ1, aˆ1, . . . , zˆn−1, aˆn−1) = q(zˆ1, aˆ1, . . . , zˆn−1, aˆn−1)[zˆn] (3.8)
P (aˆn | θˆ1, . . . , θˆn) = bn(θˆ[n]1 , . . . , θˆ[n]n )[aˆn] (3.9)
and
P (θˆn |θˆ1, . . . , θˆn−1, zˆ1, aˆ1, . . . , zˆn−1, aˆn−1, zˆn)
= ηn(zˆ1, aˆ1, . . . , zˆn−1, aˆn−1, zˆn)[θˆn] (3.10)
In other words, (θˆk)k≤n, (zˆk)k≤n, (aˆk)k<n distribute like a play in Γ if the strate-
gies b1, b2, . . . , bn−1 were used.
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We define the transition function in Λ by
qΛ(t1, b1, . . . , tn−1, bn−1)[t] =
P (fn(b1, . . . , bn−1, θˆ1, . . . , θˆn) = t|fk(b1, . . . , bk−1, θˆ1, . . . , θˆk) = tk, ∀k < n)
(3.11)
What we have described above is the dynamics of the game Λ. For a W ⊆
H∞, Player 1 wins in Λ(W ) if F (t1, t2, . . .) ∈W (and receives a payoff of 1 unit
from Player 2), and loses otherwise (and receives a payoff of −1). The following
is a variant of Lemma 4.4 in [Shmaya (2011)], and the reader is encouraged to
read the background material presented succinctly and briefly in Appendix A
there.
Lemma 3.8. The game Λ(W ) is determined when W is Borel, and val(Λ(W0)) ≥
val(Λ(W ))− ε for some compact set W0 ⊆W .
Proof. For V ⊆∏n∈N Tn×Bn, let Λ0(V ) denote the game with dynamics as in Λ
such that Player 1 wins if (t1, b1, t2, b2, . . .) ∈ V .21 Define G :
(∏
j∈N Tj×Bj
)→
H∞ by
G(t1, b1, t2, b2, . . .) = F (t1, t2, . . .)
G is continuous, and Λ(W ) = Λ0(G
−1(W )) is a stochastic game with winning
set G−1(W ), since
F (t1, t2, . . .) ∈W ⇐⇒ G(t1, b1, t2, . . .) ∈W ⇐⇒ (t1, b1, t2, . . .) ∈ G−1(W )
Therefore, Λ(W ) has a value, see [Martin (1998)]. Furthemore, there is a
compact subset C ⊆ G−1(W ) such that val(Λ0(C)) > val(Λ0(G−1(W ))) − ε
([Maitra et al (1992)]; see also [Maitra and Sudderth (1996), Ch. 6]). But
val(Λ0(C))) ≤ val(Λ0(G−1(G(C)))) = val(Λ(G(C)). We can take W0 = G(C).
W0 is compact, satisfies the require inequality as
val(Λ(W0)) = val(Λ(G(C))) ≥ val(Λ0(C)) ≥ val(Λ0(G−1(W ))−ε = val(Λ(W ))−ε
and W0 = G(C) ⊆ G(G−1(W )) = W .
Lemma 3.9. For every Borel set W ⊆ H∞,
val(Λ(W ))− 5ε ≤ val(Γ(W ))
Lemma 3.9 is the heart of the proof. If we take this Lemma as a given, then
it is easy to complete the proof of Theorem 2.13: Let Γ(W ) with W Borel be a
game which satisfies the SEPM assumption. Let ε > 0 and let W0 be a compact
subset of W as in Lemma 3.8. Then
valΓ(W ) ≥ valΓ(W0) = valΓ(W0) ≥ valΛ(W0)− 5ε > valΛ(W )− 6ε
21This is fundamentally different than Λ(W ), which is defined via the function F .
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where the first inequality follows from W0 ⊆ W , the equality from Proposition
3.6, the second inequality from Lemma 3.9, and the third inequality from the
choice of W0 via Lemma 3.8.
In a symmetric fashion, valΓ(W ) < valΛ(W ) + 6ε. Therefore, valΓ(W ) <
valΓ(W ) + 12ε for any ε > 0, so valΓ(W ) ≤ valΓ(W ), as required.
3.3 Proof of Lemma 3.9
Fix BorelW ⊆ H∞. Form ≤ n, denote the mapping gn,m : Θn×Bn−1 → HK(m)
given by
gn,m(b1, . . . , bn−1, θ1, . . . , θn) = f˜m(b1, . . . , bm−1, θ1, . . . , θm)
Let y = (yn)[n]=2 be an ε-optimal strategy for Player 2 in Γ(W ) for which
yn(θn) ∈ ∆εn for every θn ∈ Θ
2
n at each even stage n; such exists by Lemma 3.3.
Define a pure strategy y∗ of Λ defined by
y∗n(t1, b1, . . . , tn)(θ
2
n) = yn(θ
2
n) (3.12)
Let x∗ be any pure strategy of Player 1 in Λ; define a behavioral strategy
x = (xn)[n]=1 for Player 1 in Γ given by
xn(θ
1
n) = x
∗
n(t1, b1, . . . , tn)(θ
1
n) (3.13)
where t1, b1, . . . , tn is the finite history of Λ defined inductively by
bk =
{
x∗k(t1, b1, . . . , tk) if n is odd
yk if n is even
(3.14)
and
tk = pik(gn,k(θ1, . . . , θn, b1, . . . , bn−1)) = fk(θ1, . . . , θk, b1, . . . , bk−1)) (3.15)
We will join an (x, y)-random play of Γ and an (x∗, y∗)-random play of Λ
with ’almost equal’ payoffs. Let (Πk, ζk, ξk, βk, αk)k∈N be a sequence of random
variables with distribution Q such that for all n, Πn = (Π
1
n,Π
2
n) ∈ Θ2n, ζn ∈ Tn,
ξn ∈ Sn, βn ∈ Bn, αn ∈ An, and (denote Πn = (Π1, . . . ,Πn), similarly Πjn for
j = 1, 2, and for ξn, αn, βn, ζn):
Q(Πn = (θ
1
n, θ
2
n) | ξn, αn−1,Πn−1) = ηn(ξn, αn−1)[(θ1n, θ2n)] (3.16)
ζn = fn(βn−1,Πn) (3.17)
βn = x
∗
n(ζn, βn−1) for odd n, (3.18)
βn = y
∗
n(ζn, βn−1) for even n, (3.19)
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Q(αn|Π[n]n ) = βn(Π
[n]
n )[αn] (3.20)
Q(ξn = s|ξn−1, αn−1) = q(ξn−1, αn−1)[s] (3.21)
where recall that fn is defined via projection to Tn of f˜n. From (3.17) follows
then that, for all n and all k ≤ n,
(ζ1, . . . , ζk) = gn,k(Πn, βn−1) (3.22)
βn = yn for even n; in particular,
yn(Π
2
n) = βn(Π
2
n) (3.23)
Comparing (3.18) and (3.19) with (3.14) and (3.12), and (3.17) with (3.15), we
see inductive that
xn(Π
1
n) = βn(Π
1
n) (3.24)
for all odd n. Putting these last two into (3.20) gives:
Q(αn|Π[n]n ) =
{
xn(Π
1
n)[αn] if n is odd
yn(Π
2
n)[αn] if n is even
(3.25)
As such, from (3.16), (3.25), and (3.21) it is deduced that (ξn,Πn, αn) is an
(x, y)-random play of Γ; that is, this sequence of random variables distributes un-
der Q as the sequence of states and actions distribute under Px,y. Indeed, these
three equalities are precisely the dynamics of the stochastic process (ξn,Πn, αn)
under Px,y.
Now, define b0 = ∅ and, inductively, bj = x∗(ζ1, b1, . . . , ζj) for odd j, and
similarly for even j with y∗ (again, recall that x∗, y∗ are pure); equivalently,
by (3.23) and (3.24), βj = bj for j ≤ n. Then, by comparing (3.8),(3.9),(3.10)
with (3.16),(3.20), (3.21), the distribution of (θˆn, zˆn, aˆn, bn)
∞
n=1 under P is the
same as the distribution of (Πn, ξn, αn, βn)
∞
n=1 under Q. Therefore (recall that
both x∗ and y∗ are pure in Λ, and hence by (3.18) and (3.19) the sequence (ζn)
determines the sequence (βn)), we have by (3.11),
Q(ζn = t | ζ1, β1, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1) = Q(ζn = t | ζ1, . . . , ζn−1)
= Q(fn(βn−1,Πn) = t | ∀k < n, fk(βk−1,Πk) = ζk)
= P (fn(bn−1, θˆ1, . . . , θˆn) = t | ∀k < n, fk(bk−1, θˆ1, . . . , θˆn−1) = ζk)
= qΛ(t | ζ1, b1, . . . , ζn−1, bn−1) = qΛ(t | ζ1, β1, . . . , ζn−1, βn−1)
Hence ζ1, β1, ζ2, β2, . . . is an (x
∗, y∗)-random play of Λ (i.e., distributes by Px∗,y∗).
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Hence, by (3.22) and Lemma 3.7, and noting thatQ-a.s. F (ζn) = f˜n(Πn, βn−1),
|Px,y((zn, an)∞n=1 ∈W )− Px∗,y∗(F ((sn)∞n=1) ∈W )|
= |Q((ξn, αn)∞n=1 ∈W )−Q(F ((ζn)∞n=1) ∈W )|
≤ Q(((ξn, αn)∞n=1 ∈W )∆(F ((ζn)∞n=1) ∈W ))
≤ Q(∃n ∈ N, F (ζn) 6= (ξ1, α1, . . . , ξn))
= Px,y
(∃n ∈ N, f˜n(bn−1, θn) 6= (z1, a1, . . . , zK(n))) ≤ 2ε
where βk = bk = xk for odd k and βk = bk = yk for even k. Hence, since y was
ε-optimal in Γ(W ) and recalling that payoffs to the players are ±1, gives
2·Px∗,y∗(F ((sn)∞n=1) ∈W )−1 ≤ 2·(Px,y((zn, an)∞n=1 ∈W )+2ε)−1 ≤ val(Γ(W ))+5ε
Taking the supremum over all x∗ gives and recalling that Λ(W ) is determined
(Lemma 3.8) gives
val(Λ(W )) = val(Λ(W )) ≤ valΓ(W ) + 5ε
which completes the proof of Lemma 3.9.
4 Insufficiency of WSEPM
In this section, we will show that even if the game satisfies WSEPM, the value
need not exist. In fact, in the example we construct, Player 1 will be fully
informed - i.e., will possess perfect monitoring - and it’s only Player 2 whose
signals are ’blurred’.
4.1 Blurring Signals
Here, we will begin by defining what can be thought of as a decision maker (that
is, a single player) choosing at each stage n an action from22 C = {S,L}×{↑, ↓},
resulting in a signal in In+1 defined below whose conditional probability depends
on all actions chosen until now, as we describe below. This defines a transition
kernel η from infinite sequences of actions to infinite sequences of signals. De-
note D = {S,L} and B = {↑, ↓}; so that C = D×B. Fix a parameter 0 < α < 1.
Let In+1 = {0, 1}Cn (note that I1 = {∅}). We define a transition kernel η
from CN to I∞ :=
∏
n∈N In. The simplest way to describe it is by specifying the
distribution ηn+1(· | c1, . . . , cn) on In+1 given that c1, . . . , cn have been chosen,
and this will determine the kernel η (as in Section 2.3): for any in+1 ∈ In+1,
ηn+1(in+1 | c1, . . . , cn) =
{
0 if in+1(c1, . . . , cn) = 0
αKn+1(in+1)−1 · (1− α)|Cn|−Kn+1(in+1) if in+1(c1, . . . , cn) = 1
(4.1)
22{S,L} is interpreted as ’Stay’ or ’Leave’; this interpretation will be used in our example
in the next section.
20
where Kn+1(in+1) = #{(c′1, . . . , c′n) ∈ Cn | in+1(c′1, . . . , c′n) = 1}. In other
words, for each of the |Cn|(= 4n) possible histories up through n actions, Na-
ture performs independent lotteries: The true history is assigned 1, while all
other histories are assigned 1 or 0 with probabilities α, 1− α respectively.
Now, call a behavioural strategy σ normal if it does not depend on the
previous outcomes in B or on previous signals - it can depend on the previous
outcomes in D - and which plays, at each stage n, a product distribution on
D ×B whose marginal on B is the uniform ( 12 , 12 ). Formally,
σ(d1, b1, i1, . . . , dn, bn, in) = σ˜(d1, . . . , dn)⊗ (1
2
,
1
2
)
for some σ˜ : ∪∞n=0Dn → ∆(D). The proof of the following Proposition is
somewhat tedious and relies on results from the theory of branching processes,
and is given in Appendix D.
Proposition 4.1. For each ε > 0, there is 0 < α < 1, such that if 1 > α > α,
then ||Pσ − Pσ′ || < ε for any normal strategies σ, σ′, where Pσ and Pσ′ denote
the distributions induced on I∞ as a result of using σ or σ′, respectively.
4.2 The Example
This construction could be done much more generally, but for simplicity, we
build a single example and remark below how to generalize it (and it can be
generalized much further). Begin with the endurance game Γ given in Sec-
tion 2.3 of [Shmaya (2011)]: Starting with Player 1, at each stage, players
alternatively choose to stay (S) or leave (L), resulting a sequence of choices
h = (d1, e1, d2, e2, . . .). (There are no states.) Let n
1(h) = inf{n ∈ N | dn = L},
n2(h) = inf{n ∈ N | en = L}, where inf ∅ = ∞, and define the winning set of
Player 1 of this game Γ to be
W = {h | n1(h) > n2(h) or n1(h) < n2(h) =∞}
That is, Player 1 wishes to leave after Player 2, but even if Player 2 is never
going to leave, Player 1 wants to leave at some point. It is shown there that if
Player 2 has no monitoring, then val(Γ) = 0 and val(Γ) = 1;23 this is regardless
of Player 1’s monitoring structure.
Now, let 0 < ε < 14 , let B = {↑, ↓} and D = {S,L}. Define another game Γ′
in which:
• The action set of Player 1 each time he plays is A = D ×B.
• The action set of Player 2 each time he plays is E = D = {S,L}.
23In [Shmaya (2011)], a loss for Player 1 has payoff 0; while in the current paper, it has
payoff −1.
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• Player 1 has an arbitrary monitoring structure (with perfect recall).
• Player 2 has perfect recall (after he plays a move, he observes it perfectly),
and his monitoring structure of his opponent’s actions is given via the
kernel as in Section 4.1 for some fixed 1 > α > αε. Specifically, if η is the
transition kernel from that section,
η2(a1, e1, a2, , e2, a3, . . . , an) = η(a1, . . . , an)⊗n−1j=1 δej
where the term ⊗n−1j=1 δej refers to the perfect recall.
• W ′ is the inverse image of W via the projection from (A×E)N to (D×E)N.
Note that in our notation, an (resp. en) is played by Player 1 (resp. 2) at
stage 2n− 1 (resp. 2n).
Proposition 4.2. The game satisfies WSEPM.
Proof. Player 1 has perfect monitoring. As for Player 2: Let h = (a1, e1, a2, e2, . . .) 6=
h′ = (a′1, e
′
1, a
′
2, e
′
2, . . .) ∈ H∞. If they are different in some action of Player 2,
then η2(h)⊥η2(h′) since Player 2 has perfect recall. So assume they are different
in some action of Player 1. Let V be the subset of Player 2’s signal space given
by
V = {(i1, i2, . . .) | ∀n ∈ N, in+1(a1, e1, . . . , an) = 1}
i.e., which always give a signal 1 all along the history h, and define V ′ similarly
w.r.t. h′ = (a′1, e
′
1, a
′
2, e
′
2, . . .). Then clearly η
2(h)(V ) = 1, while η2(h)(V ′) = 0,
since if aK 6= a′K , then24 η2(h)(V ′) ≤ limn→∞ αn−K = 0, and symmetrically,
η2(h′)(V ′) = 1, η2(h′)(V ) = 0
Clearly, since Player 2’s strategy set is richer in Γ′ than in Γ,
val(Γ′) ≤ val(Γ) = 0
So it suffices to show that:
Lemma 4.3. val(Γ′) ≥ 1− 4ε
In fact, as our proof will show, this remains true even if we remove all of
Player 1’s monitoring of Player 2’s actions.
Proof. Let σn for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,∞ be the strategy for Player 1 that (ignoring
Player 2 actions) plays L× ( 12 , 12 ) only at his n-th turn and S× ( 12 , 12 ) otherwise
(σ∞ always plays S × ( 12 , 12 )). Fix a strategy τ of Player 2. Let δ > 0, and let
N ∈ N be such that
Pσ∞,τ ({h | N < n2(h) <∞}) < δ (4.2)
24Since false histories only get signal 1 with probability α at each stage.
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Such N clearly exists. We contend that
PσN+1,τ (W
′) > 1− δ − ε (4.3)
Indeed, by the definition of W ′,
PσN+1,τ (W
′) = PσN+1,τ ({h | N ≥ n2(h)}) + PσN+1,τ ({h | n2(h) =∞}) (4.4)
Observe that
PσN+1,τ ({h | N ≥ n2(h)}) = Pσ∞,τ ({h | N ≥ n2(h)}) (4.5)
We will show that
PσN+1,τ ({h | n2(h) =∞}) ≥ Pσ∞,τ ({h | n2(h) =∞})−ε >
(
1−Pσ∞,τ ({h | N ≥ n2(h)})−δ
)−ε
(4.6)
The right inequality follows by (4.2), and the left inequality follows from the
following argument (which makes repeated use of Lemma 5.2): The distribu-
tion sequence of signals of Player 2 that he receives about Player 1’s actions -
denote the space of all such sequences of signals25 by Θ2∞ - is determined by
the strategy of Player 1 only (assuming Player 1 uses strategies like σN+1, σ∞
which disregard Player 2’s actions.) By our assumptions and Proposition 4.1,
the total variation distance between the induced measures on Θ2∞ from playing
σN+1 or σ∞ is less than ε. τ then determines a transition kernel from Θ2∞ to
sequences of actions in {S,L}∞ of Player 2. Hence the resulting marginals of
PσN+1,τ and Pσ∞,τ on Player 2’s sequences of actions {S,L}∞ differ in total
variation by at most ε, and n2(·) depends only on these actions.
(4.4), (4.5), and (4.6) complete the proof of (4.3), which completes the proof
of the lemma since δ > 0 is arbitrary.
These construction could be generalized without too much difficulty in the
following way: Begin with any game Γ with winning set W in which Player 2
has no monitoring of his opponent’s actions such that Γ(W ) does not possess
a value. (There are no states.) For convenience, denote the action spaces of
Player 1 as D1, D2, D3, . . ., and the action sets of Player 2 as E1, E2, E3, . . .
(that is, Dk is used by Player 1 at stage 2k − 1, and Ek is used by Player 2 at
stage 2k.) Let 0 < α < 1. The description of the game Γ′ - its derivation from
Γ - now follows precisely as above, with Dn replacing D = {S,L} (resp. En
replacing E = {S,L}) at stage n. We state without proof:26
Proposition 4.4. The monitoring structure of Γ′ satisfies WSEPM but, if α
is close enough to 1, it does not possess a value.
25This space excludes his monitoring of his own past actions.
26In our example, in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we relied on the existence of near-optional
strategies of strategies of Player 1 (in the original game, without signalling) which ignore
Player 2’s actions - but a more cumbersome argument could have gone through without this
assumption.
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5 Appendix A
This section contains several short but technical results, which may be of inde-
pendent interest; recall that || · || denotes the total-variation norm.27
Lemma 5.1. Let (X,F ) be a measurable space, let µ be a complex measure on
F , and let (Fn)∞n=1 be a filtration generating F . Let µn be the restriction of µ
to Fn. Then ||µn|| → ||µ||.
Proof. That ||µn|| ≤ ||µ|| for all n follows by definition. If ||µ|| = 0, we’re
done; otherwise, normalise µ so that ||µ|| = 1, hence28 |µ| ∈ ∆(X). We have
| dµd|µ| | ≡ 1, and for any Fn-measurable function g,
∫
X
gdµn =
∫
X
gdµ. Hence,29∫
X
E|µ|[
dµ
d|µ| | Fn]dµn =
∫
X
E|µ|[
dµ
d|µ| | Fn]dµ =
∫
X
E|µ|[
dµ
d|µ| | Fn]
dµ
d|µ|d|µ|
Hence, by the martingale convergence theorem and applying the the bounded
convergence theorem to both sides,∫
X
E|µ|[
dµ
d|µ| | Fn]dµn →
∫
X
dµ
d|µ| ·
dµ
d|µ|d|µ| =
∫
X
dµ = ||µ||
Since |Eµ[ dµd|µ| |Fn]| ≤ 1, this implies lim infn→∞ ||µn|| ≥ ||µ||.
Lemma 5.2. Let X,Y be Borel space, η be a transition kernel from X to Y .
Let µ, ν ∈ ∆(X). Then30
||η(µ)− η(ν)|| ≤ ||µ− ν||
Proof.
||η(µ)− η(ν)|| = ||
∫
X
η(· | x)dµ(x)−
∫
X
η(· | x)dν(x)||
≤
∫
X
||η(· | x)||d|µ− ν|(x) =
∫
X
d|µ− ν|(x) = ||µ− ν||
Lemma 5.3. Let (X,F ) be a measurable space, let (Fn) be a filtration gen-
erating F , let µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) with µ  ν, and define µn ∈ ∆(X) on (X,F )
by31
µn(B) =
∫
B
Eν [
dµ
dν
| Fn]dν
Then µn → µ in norm and dµndν is Fn-measurable.
27The reader is referred to standard references, e.g., [Rudin (1986)], for background
measure-theoretical tools such as the total variation norm, total variation measure, and the
Radon-Nikodym derivative.
28|µ| is the total variation measure.
29z denotes the complex conjugate of z.
30Recall the notation of Section 2.1.
31Note that µn(X) = 1 and µn ≥ 0; hence, µn ∈ ∆(X).
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Proof. Clearly, dµndν = Eν [
dµ
dν | Fn] and hence is Fn-measurable. Since µn  ν
and µ  ν, it suffices to show that Eν [dµdν | Fn] → dµdν in L1(ν);32 this follows
from the martingale convergence theorem.
Corollary 5.4. Let (X,F ) be a measurable space, let (Fn) be a filtration gener-
ating F , let ν1, . . . , νM ∈ ∆(X), and let ε > 0. Then there exists µ1, . . . , µM ∈
∆(X) and N ∈ N such that ||µk − νk|| < ε and νk  µk for all k, and for any
j, k, µj , µk are equivalent
33 and dµkdµj is FN -measurable.
Proof. First define for each k = 1, . . . ,M ,
ηk = (1− ε
2
)νk +
ε
2
1
M
M∑
m=1
νm
The (ηk) are equivalent. Then, for each k = 1, . . . ,M − 1 and each n ∈ N,
denote
µnk (B) =
∫
B
Eηk+1 [
dηk
dηk+1
| Fn]dηk+1
Also let µnM = νM for all n. Then for each n and each k = 1, . . . ,M − 1, dµ
n
k
dµnk+1
is Fn-measurable (by Lemma 5.3), and hence if j < k,
dµnj
dµnk
=
∏k−1
m=j
dµnm
dµnm+1
and
dµnk
dµnj
= (
dµnj
dµnk
)−1 are Fn-measurable too. Hence, letting µk = µNk for each
k = 1, . . . ,M and N large enough gives the corollary by Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.5. Let (Ω,B, P ) be a probability space, let F ⊆ G ⊆ B be σ-algebras,
let 0 < ε < 1 and let f : Ω → [0, 1] be B-measurable with |f | ≤ 1, and suppose
that
P (|E(f | F )− f | > ε
3
2
) <
ε3
8
(5.1)
Then
P (|E(f | G )− f | > ε) < ε (5.2)
Proof. By (5.1), since |E(f | F )− f | ≤ 2,∫
Ω
|E(f | F )− f |2dP < ε
3
8
· 4 + (1− ε
2
8
)(
ε3
2
)2 < ε3
But since the conditional expectation operator E(· | F ) is a projection in L2(P )
to the space of F -measurable functions, and similarly for G ,∫
Ω
|E(f | G )− f |2dP ≤
∫
Ω
|E(f | F )− f |2dP
Furthermore, by Markov’s inequality,
ε2P (|E(f | G )− f | > ε) ≤
∫
Ω
|E(f | G )− f |2dP
32If µ, η, ν are measures with ν ≥ 0 and µ, η  ν, then ||µ− η|| = || dµ
dν
− dη
dν
||L1(ν)
33I.e., for each j, k, νj and νk have the same null sets.
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Hence,
ε2P (|E(f | G )− f | > ε) < ε3
as required.
6 Appendix B: Proof of the General Theorem
2.13
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.13 when the signal space Θ is a general
Borel space, assuming that it has already been proven when the signal space is
finite (but stage-dependent). We begin with an auxiliary result:
Lemma 6.1. Let Λ be any Borel space. Let {Fk}k be a filtration of measurable
sets of Λ that generates the Borel σ-algebra. Let V ⊆ ∆(Λ) be finite, and let A
be a finite set. For every  > 0 it holds for every N large enough that for every
measurable strategy σ : Λ → ∆(A) there exists an FN -measurable34 strategy
σ˜ : Λ→ ∆(A) such that
∀ν ∈ V, ||σ∗(ν)− σ˜∗(ν)|| < ε
Proof. Enumerate V = {ν1, . . . , νM} and let ε > 0; by Corollary 5.4, there are
V ′ = {µ1, . . . , µM} and N ∈ N such that ||µk − νk|| < ε2 and νk  µk for each
k, any two measures in V ′ are equivalent, and the Radon-Nikodym derivates of
any two measures of V ′ w.r.t. each other is FN -measurable. We contend that
for any µk, µm ∈ V ′ and n ≥ N ,∫
Eµk [σ | Fn]dµm =
∫
σdµm = σ∗(µm) (6.1)
Indeed, for n ≥ N , dµmdµk is Fn-measurable, hence∫
Eµk [σ | Fn]dµm =
∫
Eµk [σ | Fn]
dµm
dµk
dµk
=
∫
Eµk [σ
dµm
dµk
| Fn]dµk =
∫
σ
dµm
dµk
dµk =
∫
σdµm
Given σ, define35
σ˜ =
1
|V |
M∑
k=1
Eµk [σ | FN ]
Then for each k = 1, . . . ,M , by Lemma 5.2,
||σ∗(µk)− σ∗(νk)|| < ε
2
34Hence, also Fn-measurable for all n ≥ N .
35These are only defined µk-a.e.; they can be completed in an arbitrary measurable way on
null sets.
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||σ˜∗(µk)− σ˜∗(νk)|| < ε
2
Hence, for j = 1, . . . ,M ,
||σ˜∗(νk)− σ∗(νk)|| < ε+ ||σ˜∗(µk)− σ∗(µk)||
≤ ε+ 1|V |
M∑
k=1
||
∫
Λ
Eµk [σ | FN ]dµj − σ∗(µj)|| = ε
where we have used (6.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.9 (The General Case). Let Γ(W ) be any general game that
satisfies SEPM. In order to prove the determinacy of Γ(W ) we shall use a
reduction of the game Γ(W ) to a new game Γε(W ) which has a finite, stage
dependent set of signals. We begin with a simplifying assumption that will
make the proof much easier:
• (PR) We want the reduction to preserve the perfect recall requirement.
To avoid any operation that may ruin the perfect recall, enlarge the signal
spaces in the following way: At each stage, the active player receives an
additional signal (that is, in addition to that already prescribed to him
in the game) which is deterministically and uniquely determined by his
previous actions. (I.e., each stage before he plays, he is told his previous
action.) Each of these signals is from a discrete, finite space. Formally, the
new signal space at each stage is a product of the original signal space Θ
and the finite space of possible past sequences of actions of the currently
active player.
Fix  > 0. Recall that ηj(h) for j ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ N, and h ∈ Hn denotes the
distribution on Θn, the space of Player j’s first n signals, and that Σ,Υ denote
the spaces of Player 1, 2’s strategies, respectively. We shall define inductively
two sequences of finite measurable partitions {Fjn}n of {Θn}n, one for each
player j = 1, 2 such that for every n, Fjn is a finite Borel partition of Θ
n.
For such partitions and a given n let F
j
n = ⊗k≤nFjk be a partition over Θn
that is generated by {Fjk}k≤n. We note that F
j
n is clearly finer than F
j
n. This
would represent the information of Player j at stage n in the auxiliary game
Γε(W ). Let Σn ⊆ Σ be the set of strategies σ of Player 1 such that at each
odd stage k ≤ n, σk is measurable with respect to F1k. (In stages k > n, σk is
not restricted; that is, it can be any measurable mapping from Θk to ∆(A).)
Similarly let Υn be the set of such restricted behavioral strategies of Player 2.
We shall show first that we can find a sequence of partitions that satisfy the
following condition for each n ∈ N:
• (Cn) For every strategy σ ∈ Σ, there is σ′ ∈ Σn such that for every
strategy τ ∈ Υ,
‖Pσ,τ − Pσ′,τ‖ < (1− 1
2n
).
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and similarly for every τ ∈ Υ there is τ ′ ∈ Υn satisfying the similar
inequality for every σ ∈ Σ.
We construct the partition inductively as follows. Assume that {Fjk}k<n has
been defined such that condition (Ck) holds for every k < n. W.l.o.g., assume
that n is odd so that player 1 is the active player. Let V = {η1(h) | h ∈ Hn} ⊆
∆(Θn) be the finite set of measures induced on Player 1’s first n signals by the
histories through the n-th state.
We use Lemma 6.1 to construct a finite partition F1n over Θ
n such that for
every σn : Θ
n → An there exists a Fn-measurable strategy σ′n such that,
∀ν ∈ V ||(σn)∗(ν)− (σ′n)∗(ν)|| <

2n
. (6.2)
For player 2 let F2n be the null partition over Θ
n.
We claim that the strategy spaces36 Σn,Υn satisfy condition (Cn). To see
this let σ ∈ Σ be any strategy of Player 1. By the inductive construction one
can find a strategy σ˜ ∈ Σn−1 such that for every strategy τ ∈ Υ of Player 2
‖Pσ,τ − Pσ˜,τ‖ < (1− 1
2n−1
), (6.3)
Define then σ′ = (σ˜1, . . . , σ˜n−1, σ′n, σn+1, σn+2, . . .). For each hn ∈ Hn, the mea-
sure η1(hn) is in V , and since for all hn+1 ∈ Hn+1, Pσ,τ (·|hn+1) = Pσ′,τ (·|hn+1),
||Pσ′,τ (· | hn)− Pσ,τ (· | hn)|| = ||(σn)∗(η1(hn))− (σ′n)∗(η1(hn))|| <

2n
(6.4)
Therefore, since Pσ′,τ and Pσ˜,τ induce the same distributions on H

n, (6.3) and
(6.4) yield that,37
‖Pσ,τ − Pσ′,τ‖ < (1− 1
2n−1
)+
1
2n
 = (1− 1
2n
).
The above inductive construction yields two sequences of finite measurable
partitions {Fjn}n of {Θn}n one for each player j ∈ {1, 2} such that for every
strategy σ ∈ Σ of Player 1 there exists a strategy σ′ = (σ′1, σ′2, . . .) such that for
every n ∈ N, σ′n is Fn measurable for every n, and for every strategy τ of player
2 in Γ(W ),
‖Pσ,τ − Pσ′,τ‖ < 
and similarly for Player 2.
We shall make the following two additional refinements on the partitions
{Fjn}n of every player j = 1, 2:
1. For every every k the generated partition F
j
k of Θ
k preserves perfect recall
for Player j. That is, the generated partition F
j
k is measurable with respect
to the sequence of perfectly informative signals Player j receives about the
actions taken by himself up to stage k.
36Note that in this case, where n is odd, Υn = Υn−1.
37This can be seen via a generalisation of Lemma 5.2, which we do not state explicitly.
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2. For every two distinct infinite vectors of signals θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ∞ there exists a k
such that their projections θk, θ
′
k to Θk = Θ
k lie in two distinct partition
element of F
j
k.
The two conditions can be achieved by simply refining the partition elements
in the construction stage; the first, in particular, follows easily if the structure
discussed early in (PR) is assumed.
Let Γε(W ) be the game in which, for each n ∈ N, each player j = [n] uses
only F
j
n-measurable strategies. The game Γ
ε(W ) is of course equivalent to a
game where at stage n the set of signals of Player j is Θjn - which is the collection
of atoms of F jn - is finite. To see this note that the game Γ
ε(W ) is equivalent
to the game where at every stage n each player j is informed of his partition
element in Fjn. By condition 1 the game Γ
ε(W ) clearly satisfies the perfect recall
assumption.
In addition we claim that Γε(W ) satisfies SEPM: To see this let qˆ, qˆ′ be
a pair of beliefs on Nature (see Definition 2.11), and let (σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′) be a
pair of strategy profiles of Γε(W ) such that such that piH∗ (Pqˆ,σ,τ )⊥piH∗ (Pqˆ′,σ′,τ ′).
Since both (σ, τ) and (σ′, τ ′) are also strategies profiles of Γ(W ) it holds that
pij∗(Pqˆ,σ,τ )⊥pij∗(Pqˆ′,σ′,τ ′) for j = 1, 2 (see Definition 2.12) where pij : H˜∞ → Θ∞
are the projections in the original game Γ(W ). By the above Condition 2, for
every j ∈ {1, 2} there exists a Borel bijection ψ between Θ∞ and ∏n Fjn. Hence
if we let pij : H˜∞ =
∏
n(Sn × An × Θ2) →
∏
n F
j
n be the projection in the
auxiliary game Γε(W ), pij∗ = ψ∗ ◦ pij∗ and then it must hold for every player j
that pij∗(Pqˆ,σ,τ )⊥pij∗(Pqˆ′,σ′,τ ′).38 Therefore the game Γε(W ) is determined, by
the version of Theorem 2.13 for finite signal spaces.
We claim that
valΓ(W ) ≥ val(Γ(W ))− 2.
To see this note that by construction every strategy σ′ in Γ(W ) guarantees the
same payoff up to 2 in Γ(W ).39 Similarly,
valΓ(W ) ≤ val(Γ(W )) + 2.
Hence,
valΓ(W )− valΓ(W ) ≤ 4.
Since ε is arbitrary it follows that Γ(W ) is determined.
7 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3.1
Lemma 7.1. Let σ, τ be any strategy profile of a game satisfying SEPM and let
j ∈ {1, 2}. There exists for each n ∈ N and for each h ∈ Hn satisfying Pσ,τ (h) >
38Since ψ is injective, ψ∗ preserves mutual singularity.
39Recall that the payoffs are ±1.
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0 a strategy profile σh, τh and a belief of Nature q˜h such that Pσh,τh,q˜h(·) =
Pσ,τ (· | h), and hence for h 6= h′ ∈ Hn, pij∗(Pσ,τ (· | h))⊥pij∗(Pσ,τ (· | h′)), where
pij denotes the projection to Player j’s signal space as in Definition 2.6.
Proof. Simply define σh, τh, q˜h to make pure choices up through the choice of
the n’s state which agree with h, and to agree with σ, τ, q thereafter; since
Pσ,τ (h) > 0, this indeed defines a belief of Nature. The second part then follows
from the definition of SEPM.
Recall that,
pij∗(Pσ,τ (· | h)) =
∫
H∞
ηj(ω)(·)dpiH∗ (P (ω | h)) = η(piH∗ (Pσ,τ (· | h)))
where piH is the projection to H∞, as in Definition 2.6. In other words,
pij∗(Pσ,τ (· | h)) is the measure induced by η and piH∗ (Pσ,τ (· | h)). Hence, Propo-
sition 3.1 follows from the previous lemma, and the following lemma (by taking
(Aα) = (h)h∈Hn):
Lemma 7.2. Let X,Y be standard Borel spaces, let µ ∈ ∆(X) and let A1, . . . , An ⊆
X be disjoint Borel sets which satisfy µ(∪Aj) = 1, µ(Aj) > 0 for all j; denote
µj = µ(·|Aj). Let η be a transition kernel from X to Y such that η(µi)⊥η(µj)
for i 6= j. Then for any filtration (Ft)t of Y generating the Borel σ-algebra40
F and each j, Pµ(Aj | Ft) →
t→∞ 1 η(µj)-a.s..
Proof. Since (Pµ(Aj | Ft))t is a martingale, by the martingale convergence
theorem, it suffices to show that Pµ(Aj | F ) = 1 η(µj)-a.s.. By assumption
there are disjoint B1, . . . , Bn such that η(µi)(Bj) = 1 if i = j and = 0 if i 6= j,
and in particular that:
Pµ((Aj × Y )∆(X ×Bj)) = 0, j = 1, . . . , n (7.1)
It suffices to show that Pµ(Aj | F ) = 1 η(µ)-a.s. in Bj ; by (7.1), it suffices to
show that Pµ(Bj | F ) = 1 η(µ)-a.s. in Bj , which is immediate.
8 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4.1
Fix ε > 0, and 0 < α < 1, and on I∞, define the following measure P : We can
write I∞ =
∏
n∈N{1, 0}C
n
and hence define P = ⊗n∈N ⊗(c1,...,cn)∈Cn (α, 1− α).
Proposition 8.1. For any normal strategy σ, ||Pσ − P || → 1 as α→ 1, where
Pσ denotes the marginal on I∞.41
This proposition clearly implies Proposition 4.1.
40A σ-algebra F on Y implicity introduces the σ-algebra {∅, X} ×F on X × Y .
41In one calculation below, Pσ will refer to the product measure on DN × I∞.
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Proof. By the bounded convergence theorem, it suffices to consider normal σ
which makes pure choices in D; let d∞ = (d1, d2, d3, . . .) be the sequence in DN
that σ chooses. For k ∈ N, let Bdn = {(d1, b1, . . . , dn, bn) ∈
∏
k≤n(dk × B)}
- i.e., histories of length n which agree with d∞ in their choices in D. Let
In+1 =
∏
k≤n{0, 1}C
k
. By Lemma 5.1, in order to prove the proposition it is
sufficient to show that for every δ there exists α0, such that if α > α0, then for
all n ∈ N, ||Pnσ − Pn|| < δ, where Pnσ ,Pn are the marginals of Pσ, P on In+1.
Let in+1 ∈ In+1. Let
K(in+1) = | ∪k≤n {(c1, . . . , ck) ∈ Ck | ik+1(c1, . . . , ck) = 1}|
and denote Jn =
∑n
k=1 |Ck|. Now,
P (in+1) = α
K(in+1)(1− α)Jn−K(in+1)
while (since conditional on h ∈ Bdn, the coordinates of the signal are chosen
independently, with the n coordinates along the true path being given 1 for
certain, and the others randomised independently with probabilities (α, 1−α)),
Pnσ (in+1) =
∑
h∈Bdn
Pσ(in+1 | h)Pσ(h)
=
∑
h=(d1,b1,...,dn,bn)∈Bdn
1
|Bdn|
αK(in+1)−n(1− α)Jn−K(in+1) ·
n∏
j=1
ij+1(d1, b1, . . . , dj , bj)
= αK(in+1)(1− α)Jn−K(idn+1)[α−n · 1|Bdn|
∑
h=(d1,b1,...,dn,bn)∈Bdn
n∏
j=1
ij+1(d1, b1, . . . , dj , bj)]
Hence, since |Bdn| = 2n,
Pnσ (in+1)
Pn(in+1)
= α−n · 1
2n
∑
h=(d1,b1,...,dn,bn)∈Bdn
n∏
j=1
ij+1(d1, b1, . . . , dj , bj)
=
#{(d1, b1, . . . , dn, bn) ∈ Bdn | ∀j ≤ n, ij+1(d1, b1, . . . , dj , bj) = 1}
(2α)n
(8.1)
Since d1, d2, . . . are fixed, the proof of the proposition will be complete if we
show that:
Lemma 8.2. Let Q = ⊗n∈N(α, 1−α)2n on Θ = Θ1×Θ2×· · · =
∏
n∈N{1, 0}2
n
,
and let
Yn(θ1, θ2, . . .) =
#{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ 2n | ∀k ≤ n, θk(x1, . . . , xk) = 1}
(2α)n
Then for any ε > 0, there is α0 < 1 such that if 1 > α > α0, for each n ∈ N,
there is a set An ⊆ In+1 such that Q(An) > 1− ε and |Yn − 1| < ε in An.
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The lemma can also be stated: In a branching process in which each node
splits into two branches, each of which ’lives’ with probability α, if α is close
enough to 1, then for any n ∈ N, it holds on a set of arbitrarily large (uniformly
in n) measure the set of surviving branches at stage n is close to an (2α)n-
fraction of the total number of 2n possible branches that could have existed.
Proof. Let γ = 2α; it follows from [Karlin and Taylor, Sec 8.2] that E(Yn) = 1,
and if γ 6= 1,
V ar(Yn) = V ar(Y1)γ
n−1 γ
n − 1
γ2n(γ − 1) ≤ V ar(Y1)
1
γ(γ − 1) =
1− α
2α− 1 .
Hence supn V ar(Yn) approaches zero as α approaches one. The lemma follows
directly from Chebyshev’s inequality.
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